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Szilárd Gáspár-Szilágyi & Maxim Usynin∗ 
 
 
Abstract 
 
This paper focuses on the ways in which investment tribunals constituted under 
intra-EU BITs and the Energy Charter Treaty (in an intra-EU dispute) have reacted 
to the Court of Justice’s Achmea judgment of 6 March 2018. The first part of the 
paper maps out the existing intra-EU arbitrations in which the issues arising from 
Achmea appear in one form or another. We then take a critical look at how the 
disputing parties have used Achmea in their argumentation and how the investment 
tribunals have dismissed these arguments and upheld their jurisdiction. The second 
part of the paper is analytical. When the tribunals uphold their jurisdiction and 
decide on the merits, they knowingly deliver an award, which is unenforceable in 
the Respondent State and the entirety of the EU. By drawing parallels with decisions 
rendered by other international tribunals, we argue that the rendering of potentially 
unenforceable awards is not specific to intra-EU investment disputes. We then look 
at why international tribunals render potentially unenforceable awards. The third 
part of the paper presents several suggestions of how intra-EU investment tribunals 
should tackle the Achmea conundrum, either by declining their jurisdiction pursuant 
to judicial comity or upholding their jurisdiction but dismissing the cases as 
inadmissible.  
 
 
1 Introduction 
                                                          
∗ Szilárd is a former Postdoctoral Fellow at PluriCourts, University of Oslo [szilard.gaspar-
szilagyi@jus.uio.no]. Maxim is a Doctoral Fellow at CEVIA, University of Copenhagen 
[maksim.usynin@jur.ku.dk]. This work was partly supported by the Research Council of Norway 
through its Centres of Excellence funding scheme, project number 223274, and the Danish Council 
for Independent Research. We thank Daniel Behn (Liverpool, Oslo) for allowing us to use some of 
his newest dataset and we also thank the organizers of and participants to the ‘EU Law, Trade 
Agreements, and Dispute Resolution Mechanisms: Contemporary Challenges’ Conference (Kings 
College, 21-22 March 2019) for their constructive comments. 
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The EU’s exercise of its post-Lisbon competences over foreign direct investment 
(FDI) has been anything but smooth.1 The difficult task of solving some of the 
major challenges faced by this new policy area reverted to the Court of Justice of 
the European Union (Court of Justice). Beyond their effects within the EU legal 
order, the rulings of the Court have very important external policy and legal 
implications. For example, in Opinion 2/152, the Court of Justice clarified the EU 
and EU Member State competences over the EU’s new generation of free trade and 
investment agreements, which resulted in the splitting of the EU-Singapore Free 
Trade Agreement (FTA) into separate trade and investment agreements.3 By doing 
so, the Court pointed out a path different than the growing trend of combining trade 
and investment chapters under one treaty roof.4 
 Furthermore, in Achmea5 the Court held that investor-state arbitration clauses 
under international agreements between EU Member States, “such as” the one 
under the Netherlands-Slovakia Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT), are precluded by 
EU law. This judgment will result in the termination of almost 200 intra-EU Bilateral 
Investment Treaties (BITs)6 and the non-enforcement of ITA awards7 rendered 
under them within the EU. Similarly, the indeterminate wording of “such as” raises 
the question whether Achmea applies to intra-EU disputes under the Energy Charter 
Treaty (ECT), which would make the awards of intra-EU tribunals constituted 
under it unenforceable within the EU legal order. Whilst the European Commission 
(Commission) has long advocated for the inapplicability of such awards due to the 
ECT’s “implicit disconnection clause”,8 the Court of Justice has yet to explicitly 
back this argument.  
 Recently, the Court of Justice - in Opinion 1/17, requested by Belgium under 
the insistencies of Wallonia – concluded that the Investment Court System (ICS) in 
                                                          
1   See Sz Gáspár-Szilágyi, ‘Quo Vadis EU Investment Law and Policy? The Shaky Path towards the 
International Promotion of EU Rules’ [2018] 23(2) European Foreign Affairs Review 167. 
2   CJEU Opinion 2/15 (EU-Singapore FTA), ECLI:EU:C:2017:376.  
3   European Commission, ‘EU-Singapore Trade and Investment Agreements’ (Authentic Texts as of 
April 2018) <http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=961> accessed on 1 June 2019.  
4   M Usynin and Sz Gáspár-Szilágyi, ‘The Growing Tendency of Including Investment Chapters in 
PTAs’ in F Amtenbrink et al (eds) Netherlands Yearbook of International Law 17 [2018] vol 48. 
5   CJEU Slovak Republic v Achmea BV, ECLI:EU:C:2018:158. 
6   Declaration of the Member States of 15 January 2019 on the Legal Consequences of the Achmea 
Judgment and on Investment Protection, <https://ec.europa.eu/info/publications/190117-bilateral-
investment-treaties_en> accessed on 1 June 2019.  
7   German Federal Court of Justice (BGH), Decision I ZB 2/15 in which the German Federal Court 
set aside the arbitral award of 22 million euros in favour of Achmea BV, following the Court of Justice’s 
judgment.   
8   See, for example, Charanne BV and Construction Investments SARL v The Kingdom of Spain, SCC Case 
No 062/2012, Final Award, 21 January 2016, paras 223, 252, 433–439; RREEF Infrastructure (GP) 
Limited and RREEF Pan-European Infrastructure Two Lux Sà r.l v Kingdom of Spain, ICSID Case No 
ARB/13/30, Decision on Jurisdiction, 6 June 2016, paras 67, 81–87.  
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the agreement with Canada (CETA) is compatible with EU law.9 This opinion will 
not only affect the entry into force and conclusion of the EU’s trade and investment 
agreements with Canada, Singapore, Vietnam and Mexico, but it will have broader 
implications for the multilateral investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) reform 
process10 and the EU’s investment policy. Opinion 1/17 goes beyond the scope of 
this paper and will therefore not be discussed.  
 Achmea and Opinion 1/17 are not singular cases, but form part of an established 
and ever-expanding case law of the Court of Justice on the relationship between 
extra-EU dispute settlement mechanisms (DSMs) and EU law.11 The Achmea 
judgment also has important practical implications for pending and future arbitral 
cases in an intra-EU context. 
 This paper leaves behind the discussion on how Achmea fits into the Court’s 
existing case law on the autonomy of EU law and extra-EU DSMs12 and instead 
focuses on the investment arbitration perspective; more specifically, the ways in 
which  investment-treaty arbitral (ITA) tribunals have reacted to the Achmea ruling. 
Furthermore, we focus on how ITA tribunals can ameliorate the tensions between 
EU law and investment law, and not on how the political actors are to solve these 
issues, either by terminating or amending intra-EU BITs and the ECT. 
 The first part of the paper is descriptive and maps out the existing intra-EU 
arbitrations in which issues arising from Achmea appear in one form or another. We 
have covered cases that were pending when the Court delivered Achmea (which 
could either be pending or concluded at the moment of writing) and cases that were 
initiated after the Court’s ruling. This includes cases initiated under both intra-EU 
BITs and the ECT, if the latter concerns disputes between EU Member States. 
Furthermore, the analysis does not focus on domestic enforcement proceedings 
after the awards were delivered (although some are briefly mentioned) or 
proceedings that involve the annulment or rectification of awards.  
 Based on the empirical data, we take a critical look at how the disputing parties 
have used Achmea in their argumentation. Our hypothesis is that the respondent EU 
Member States raise Achmea in the jurisdictional phase, as an argument against the 
                                                          
9   CJEU, Opinion 1/17 (CETA Investment Court) ECLI:EU:C:2019:341.  
10  UNCITRAL, Working Group III, Investor-State Dispute Settlement Reform 
<http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/%20en/commission/working_groups/3Investor_State.html > 
accessed on 1 June 2019. 
11  CJEU Opinion 1/91 (EEA I) ECLI:EU:C:1991:49; Opinion 1/92 (EEA II), ECLI:EU:C:1992:189; 
Opinion 1/00 ECLI:EU:C:2002:231; Opinion 1/09 (European Patent Court) ECLI:EU:C:2011:123; Opinion 
2/13 (Accession to the ECHR) ECLI:EU:C:2014:2454.  
12  See C Contartese and M Andenas, ‘EU autonomy and investor-state dispute settlement under inter 
se agreements between EU Member States: Achmea’ [2019] 56 CMLR 157; I J D H Pohl, ‘Intra-EU 
Investment Arbitration after the Achmea Case: Legal Autonomy Bounded by Mutual Trust?’ [2018] 
14(4) European Constitutional Law Review 767; Sz Gáspár-Szilágyi, ‘It is Not Just About Investor-
State Arbitration. A Look at Case C-284/16, Achmea BV’ [2018] 3(1) European Papers 357.   
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tribunals having jurisdiction. It is also highly likely that the Commission intervenes 
as an amicus curiae or a non-disputing party. We then look at how the tribunals have 
reacted to the Achmea related arguments of the disputing parties. Looking at pre-
Achmea arbitral cases in which the Respondent Member States unsuccessfully relied 
on EU law to argue against the tribunals’ jurisdiction, we expect that the arbitral 
tribunals will dismiss the Achmea argument based on the ground that they derive 
their jurisdiction from international investment agreements, and not from EU law. 
We also take account of whether arbitral tribunals have come up with novel reasons 
for dismissing the relevance of EU law to their jurisdiction or whether they are more 
inclined to follow the path established by earlier tribunals.  
 The second part of the paper is analytical. If the tribunals uphold their 
jurisdiction and decide on the merits, they will knowingly deliver an award which is 
unenforceable in the Respondent State and the entirety of the EU. Drawing parallels 
with disputes rendered by other international tribunals, such as the South China Sea 
arbitration13 and the Arctic Sunrise dispute,14 we argue that the upholding of 
jurisdiction, when tribunals render potentially unenforceable awards, is not specific 
to intra-EU investment disputes. Then we discuss why might international tribunals 
uphold their jurisdiction when they render potentially unenforceable awards or 
decisions.  
 In the third part of the paper we discuss various suggestions on how intra-EU 
investment tribunals could tackle the Achmea conundrum, either by declining their 
jurisdiction pursuant to judicial comity or upholding their jurisdiction but dismissing 
the cases as inadmissible.  
 
2 Arbitral Tribunals Uphold Their Jurisdiction after Achmea as well  
In Achmea, the Court of Justice concluded that EU law - and more specifically 
Articles 267 and 344 TFEU - precludes ITA provisions in international agreements 
concluded between EU Member States, “such as” as the ITA provisions under the 
Netherlands-Slovakia BIT. Due to the Court’s broad phrasing of “such as”– 
repeated several times in the judgment - commentators soon began to wonder 
whether the judgment should only apply to intra-EU BITs or to other international 
agreements as well, such as the ECT, or even BITs between EU Member States and 
third countries.15 In this section, we take the view that the wording used in Achmea 
is broad enough to make the judgment applicable to the ECT. The use of “such as” 
in relation to “international agreements concluded between Member States” does 
not limit the application of the judgment to BITs only, but makes the judgment 
                                                          
13  PCA, The South China Sea Arbitration (The Republic of Philippines v The People’s Republic of China), Final 
Award, 12 July 2016. 
14  ITLOS, The Arctic Sunrise Case (Kingdom of the Netherlands v Russian Federation) Case No 22.   
15  See n 12. 
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applicable to the ECT as well, when an EU investor brings a claim against another 
EU Member State (i.e. in an intra-EU setting). In such cases, the ECT functions in 
the same manner as an intra-EU BIT.16 
 As Annex 1 illustrates, at the moment of writing, there are 98 intra-EU 
investment arbitrations - brought under various intra-EU BITs, the ECT, or both – 
that were pending when Achmea was delivered or were initiated after that. Most of 
the cases are still pending, but in eight of them (six concluded and two pending) the 
tribunals have already discussed the implications of Achmea.  In the following 
sections, we discuss how the disputing parties have relied on the Court of Justice’s 
Achmea judgment and the ways in which the investment tribunals have reacted to 
these arguments. We will also provide a brief overview of the pre-Achmea cases (see 
Annex 2).   
 
2.1 How do the Disputing Parties Rely on Achmea? 
Raising arguments based on EU law before an arbitral tribunal is not a novelty and 
by now, there is a certain practice of it.17 Eastern Sugar v Czech Republic,18 initiated 
under the Czech-Netherlands BIT and decided in 2004, was the first case in which 
the issue arose whether or not an investment tribunal should take into account 
arguments based on EU law in the jurisdictional phase of the dispute. The 
Commission sent a letter to the Czech Republic, based on which the Respondent 
argued that the Tribunal lacked jurisdiction as the EU Treaties had superseded the 
BIT after the accession of the Czech Republic to the EU.19 The Tribunal rejected 
these arguments and upheld its jurisdiction. It held that there was no implicit or 
explicit termination of the intra-EU BIT when the Czech Republic acceded to the 
EU.20  
  The years that followed saw a string of cases (see Annex 2) initiated under 
intra-EU BITs or under the ECT in an intra-EU context, in which the Respondent 
Member State and the Commission – as amicus or non-disputing party – raised 
objections based on EU law against the jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunals. Among 
others, the Respondents and the Commission based their arguments on the primacy 
                                                          
16  For a detailed discussion of whether the Achmea judgment applies to the ECT, see Expert 
Declaration of Steffen Hindelang in Support of Respondent the Kingdom of Spain’s Motion to 
Dismiss and to Deny Confirmation of Foreign Arbitral Award in USDC for the District of Columbia, 
Novenergia II v Kingdom of Spain, Civil Action No. 1:18-cv-1148. See also J Kleinheisterkamp, ‘Investment 
Protection and EU Law: The Intra- and Extra-EU Dimension of the Energy Charter Treaty’ [2012] 
15 JIEL 85. 
17  See C Contartese, ‘EU law as Applicable Law in International Disputes and its Procedural 
Implications’, in M Andenas et al (eds) The EU External Action in International Economic Law. Recent Trends 
and Developments (Asser Press/Springer, forthcoming). 
18  Eastern Sugar v Czech  Republic, SCC 088/2004, Partial Award, 27 March 2007. 
19  Ibid., para 119.  
20  Ibid., paras 142-180.  
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and autonomy of EU law,21 as well as EU state aid rules.22 In the recent A11Y v 
Czech Republic, commenced under the UK-Czech BIT prior to Achmea, the Czech 
Republic once again argued that EU law had superseded the BIT following its 
accession to the EU, whilst the Claimant objected to this argument based on past 
cases23 dealing with this issue and pursuant to Articles 59 and 65 of the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT).24 The Tribunal, just as every other 
tribunal before it,25 rejected these EU law objections and upheld its jurisdiction, 
arguing that according to both parties to the BIT, the agreement was still in force. 
Whilst the Tribunal in this case, for the sake of judicial economy, handled the EU 
law objection in a laconic fashion, other tribunals have spent considerably more time 
on this matter, even going so far as to interpret EU law, such as when the Tribunal 
in Euram v Slovakia interpreted Article 344 TFEU as not applying to intra-EU BITs.26  
  Thus, one would expect that following Achmea, the Respondent Member 
States and the intervening Commission would continue objecting to the jurisdiction 
of the tribunals. The difference, however, compared to the aforementioned cases is 
that now the arguments have a lot more solid backing: the judgment of the Court 
of Justice. It is one thing for a member of a regional organization and its ‘executive’ 
body to argue that they view the law of the regional organization as precluding the 
jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunals. It is a completely different situation when the 
‘constitutional court’ of that organization – which has the ultimate authority to 
render binding interpretations of the organization’s law – holds that the jurisdiction 
of said arbitral tribunals is incompatible with the law of the organization.  
  The post-Achmea cases have followed the same pattern as the pre-Achmea 
cases with the Respondent Member States challenging the tribunals’ jurisdiction on 
the basis of EU law and Achmea, while the investors use the judgment for the 
opposite reason. Every now and then, the Commission intervenes as an amicus. For 
example, in both Masdar v Spain and UP and CD v Hungary, initiated under the ECT 
and the France-Hungary BIT respectively, the Respondents requested the tribunals 
                                                          
21  See, for example, Euram v Slovakia, PCA 2010-17, First Award on Jurisdiction, 22 October 2012.  
22  See, for example, Micula v Romania, ICSID ARB/05/20, Final Award, 11 December 2013.  
23  Claimant refers to RREEF Infrastructure (G.P.) Limited and RREEF Pan-European Infrastructure Two 
Lux S.a.r.1. v Kingdom of Spain, ICSID Case No ARB/13/30, Decision on Jurisdiction, 6 June 2016, 
CL-130, para 89 “the Tribunal underlines that in all published or known investment treaty cases in 
which the intra-EU objection has been invoked by the Respondent, it has been rejected”. 
24  A11Y Ltd v Czech Republic, ICSID Case No UNCT/15/1, Decision on Jurisdiction, 9 February 
2017, paras 152-169. 
25  The Tribunal referencing Micula v Romania (n 22) RL-68, para 321; Eastern Sugar v Czech Republic (n 
18) para 167; Achmea BV v The Slovak Republic, UNCITRAL, PCA Case No. 2008-13 (formerly Eureko 
BV v The Slovak Republic), Award on Jurisdiction, Arbitrability and Suspension, 26 October 2010, RL-
43, paras 244-252; Jan Oostergetel and Theodora Laurentius v The Slovak Republic, UNCITRAL, Decision on 
Jurisdiction, 30 April 2010, CL-94, paras 80-85; Euram v Slovakia (n 21), paras 186-210. 
26  Euram v Slovakia (n 21) paras 248-267.  
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to interpret the ITA provisions in line with EU law, while the Claimants argued that 
Achmea was not relevant for the Tribunal’s jurisdiction.27 In the pending ECT case 
of Vattenfall v Germany, the arguments differed slightly. The Respondent State and 
the intervening Commission argued that EU law was part of the applicable law; thus, 
Achmea was applicable to the ECT. The Claimant, however, argued that EU law was 
not part of international law and the applicable law, and thus Achmea was not 
applicable to the ECT.28  
  The Respondents’ reliance on a ruling of the Court of Justice is meant to 
raise the importance of the issue and send a signal to the arbitral tribunals that not 
only the political actors of the EU, but the main judicial body also backs a certain 
interpretation. The next section, however, illustrates how the tribunals were not 
persuaded by the new arguments based on Achmea. 
 
2.2   How Do the Tribunals Respond to Achmea? 
As discussed, in the pre-Achmea cases, the arbitral tribunals always upheld their 
jurisdiction whenever the Commission or the Respondent objected to it on EU law 
grounds. The most commonly used argument was that the tribunals derive their 
jurisdiction from international agreements and not EU law, and that the EU Treaties 
did not supersede the intra-EU BITs. Thus, one would expect tribunals to use the 
same arguments in the post-Achmea cases as well. However, there is also the issue 
of Achmea’s applicability to the ECT. It can be expected that some ECT tribunals 
might argue that Achmea is not applicable to them as it is only applicable to intra-
EU BITs. However, some tribunals could show greater deference to the ruling of 
the Court of Justice as opposed to the Commission’s objections. Whilst the 
Commission is charged with “oversee[ing] the application of Union law”,29 the 
Court of Justice is the institution that “ensure[s] that in the interpretation and 
application of the [EU] Treaties the law is observed”30 and it is the only institution 
that can provide binding interpretations of EU law.31 
  This section classifies the tribunals’ responses into two groups. The first 
group comprises the cases where the tribunals agreed to dwell into the jurisdictional 
effects of Achmea and eventually rejected Achmea’s applicability to the dispute. The 
second group comprises the cases where the tribunals refused to consider Achmea 
as part of the jurisdictional argument, citing various procedural impediments. Such 
procedural impediments are worth evaluating against any preclusive effects Achmea 
may have on the tribunals’ jurisdiction, especially when it comes to intra-EU BIT 
                                                          
27  Masdar v Spain, ICSID Case No ARB/14/1, Award, 16 May 2018; UP and DC v Hungary, ICSID 
Case No ARB/13/35, Award, 9 October 2018.  
28  Vattenfall v Germany, ICSID Case No ARB/12/12, Decision on Achmea Issue, 31 August 2018.  
29  Treaty on the European Union (TEU), Article 17(1).  
30  TEU, Article 19(1). 
31  Opinion 2/13 (Accession to the ECHR) ECLI:EU:C:2014:2454, para 242. 
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cases. Indeed, one may question to what extent a late filing of a jurisdictional 
objection should lead to the same result as a timely filing, assuming that the latter 
would ordinarily result in a termination of the proceedings. 
  Before proceeding to the analysis, a further delimitation deserves mention. 
This paper concerns the effects and responses to Achmea, excluding cases where the 
parties and the tribunals have ignored Achmea as part of the legal argument. An 
example is the afore-mentioned A11Y v Czech Republic arbitration in which, even 
though the Respondent raised EU law objections to the Tribunal’s jurisdiction, it 
did not mention the Achmea case that was pending at that point in time. The Tribunal 
decided on the jurisdiction prior to the Achmea judgment, but rendered its final 
award after Achmea, which had not mentioned the judgment.32 Interestingly, the 
Tribunal discussed the termination of intra-EU BITs in the final award as well, not 
just in the decision on jurisdiction, and concluded that both parties to the BIT in 
question treated it as still active and valid.33 This suggests that tribunals will not 
tackle the Achmea issue proprio motu, but the disputing parties must actively raise it. 
In addition, tribunals have been continuously critical to the ‘automatic termination 
of BITs by accession to the EU’ argument, which needs to be supplemented by 
some active measures from EU Member States. 
 
2.2.1 Tribunals that Admit Achmea as a Jurisdictional Objection 
EU Member States have relied on Achmea as a jurisdictional objection. An objection 
must nevertheless follow the procedural timeline of the dispute and has to be 
addressed together with other jurisdictional arguments. Alternatively, if the 
proceedings have advanced beyond the jurisdictional stage, States may request the 
consideration of Achmea beyond the procedural timeline as a new fact or 
circumstance. This section reviews the responses of tribunals which have agreed to 
consider Achmea as a jurisdictional objection within or after the procedural timeline 
for submitting such objections.  
 
2.2.1.1  Achmea Does Not Apply to the ECT and Other Multilateral Treaties 
Some tribunals have decided that Achmea does not have a preclusive effect on intra-
EU arbitrations under the ECT. This argument is gaining traction and has come to 
be adopted in several intra-EU disputes initiated pursuant to the ECT.  
One example is the Masdar v Spain award rendered under the ECT. Similarly to over 
three dozen other cases, the claim arose following the change in the regulatory 
framework of investments in solar energy in Spain. When the Court of Justice 
                                                          
32  A11Y LTD v Czech Republic, ICSID Case No UNCT/15/1, Award, 29 June 2018. 
33  Ibid., paras 174–178. 
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delivered the Achmea judgment, the Tribunal had already closed the proceedings.34 
Nevertheless, the Respondent applied for the re-opening of the proceedings under 
Article 38(2) of the ICSID Convention Arbitration Rules, which allows for the re-
opening of proceedings under exceptional circumstances “on the ground that new 
evidence is forthcoming of such a nature as to constitute a decisive factor, or that 
there is a vital need for clarification on certain specific points”.35  
  In its request, the Respondent stipulated that Achmea referred to 
international agreements in general, including the ECT, which would deprive the 
Tribunal of jurisdiction.36 The Tribunal rejected the argument on two grounds. 
Firstly, the Achmea judgment concerned a BIT between the Netherlands and the 
Czech and Slovak Federal Republic. Therefore, it “[could not] be applied to 
multilateral treaties, such as the ECT, to which the EU itself is a party.”37 Secondly, 
with regard to the ECT, the Tribunal referred to the Opinion of Advocate General 
Wathelet who had not seen the “slightest suspicion that it might be incompatible 
[with the TEU and TFEU].”38 The Tribunal then referred to the silence of the Court 
of Justice on the matter of the ECT’s compatibility with EU law and adopted the 
position of the Advocate General.39 One may add that the Tribunal’s reliance on the 
latter brings back the questions of power distribution and authoritative 
interpretations within the EU legal order. It follows that the three different bodies: 
the Commission, the Advocate General and the CJEU, may manifest different 
positions, creating contradictory reliance expectations for third parties. 
  The most profound discussion on the role of Achmea happened in another 
oft-discussed case, Vattenfall v Germany (II), which remains pending at the moment 
of writing. The Tribunal responded to the Achmea objection in a separate 74-page 
long decision, discussing a long range of issues from the history of the ECT’s 
adoption to questions concerning the enforceability of arbitral awards.40 Firstly, the 
Tribunal agreed with the Respondent that the rendering of the Achmea judgment 
amounted to a timely-lodged jurisdictional objection under ICSID Arbitration Rule 
41.41 The discussion that followed concerned the compatibility of the ECT with the 
EU legal order. The Tribunal took international law as a common denominator, 
                                                          
34  Masdar Solar & Wind Cooperatief UA v Kingdom of Spain, ICSID Case No ARB/14/1, Award, 16 May 
2018, para 80. 
35  Rules of Procedure for Arbitration Proceedings (Arbitration Rules) 2006 Rule 38(2). 
36  Masdar v Spain (n 34) para 675. 
37  Ibid., para 679. 
38  Opinion of Advocate General Wathelet, Delivered on 19 September 2017 in Case C‑284/16 
Slowakische Republik v Achmea BV’ ECLI:EU:C:2017:699, para 43; Masdar v Spain (Award) (n 34) para 
681. 
39  Masdar v Spain (Award) (n 34) para 682. 
40   Vattenfall v Germany, ICSID Case No ARB/12/12, Decision on Achmea Issue, 31 August 2018. 
41  Ibid., 98–107. 
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interpreting EU law as part of international law.42 Relying on the international rules 
of treaty interpretation, the Tribunal found no contradictions between the ECT and 
the EU legal order. Accordingly, the Tribunal rejected the expansive reading of 
Achmea as precluding investor-state arbitration under the ECT.43 
  Later, in Foresight v Spain, an  Stockholm Chamber of Commerce (SCC) 
case under the ECT, the Tribunal first clarified that pursuant to the textual 
interpretation of the ECT, it had jurisdiction.44 It further affirmed that only the 
provisions of the ECT determined the question of jurisdiction, while EU law was 
“not relevant to the question of the Tribunal’s jurisdiction.”45 The Tribunal 
responded to the Achmea judgment by expressly agreeing with the Masdar v Spain 
award, previously discussed.46 It added that there are no known intra-EU cases 
where the ECT objection has worked in favour of the Respondent states.47 
  In RREEF v Spain, an ICSID case pursuant to the ECT, the Tribunal 
stressed that Achmea and the case before it concerned different legal instruments.48 
More importantly, it also added a few thoughts on the relationship between EU law 
and the ECT. The Tribunal reminded that the EU itself was a party to the ECT, 
which binds both the EU and non-EU states. According to the Tribunal, it would 
be “highly improper” for the EU to impose the incompatibility of the ECT with EU 
law on non-EU states.49 One may suggest that the Tribunal sought to neutralize any 
potential or future findings of the Court of Justice that the ECT is incompatible 
with EU law.  
 Lastly, in Greentech v Italy, the Tribunal made a strong reminder that the 
ECT required tribunals to decide disputes in accordance with the ECT itself and the 
applicable rules and principles of international law, but not EU law: 
In the context of the arbitral jurisdiction created by the ECT, reference to 
“international law” cannot be stretched to include EU law, absent doing violence to the 
text which would be impermissible under the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (…).50 
(emphasis added)  
  In conclusion, despite the broad wording of Achmea that would allow for 
its application to the ECT, the arbitral tribunals all came to the same conclusions: 
                                                          
42  Ibid., 150. 
43  Ibid., 161-165. 
44  Foresight Luxembourg Solar 1 Sàrl, et al v Kingdom of Spain, SCC Case No 2015/150, Final Award, 14 
November 2018, para 212. 
45  Ibid., 218–219. 
46  Ibid., 220. 
47  Ibid., 221. 
48  RREEF Infrastructure (GP) Limited and RREEF Pan-European Infrastructure Two Lux Sà r.l v Kingdom 
of Spain, ICSID Case No ARB/13/30, Decision on Responsibility and on the Principles of Quantum, 
30 November 2018, para 211. 
49  Ibid. 
50  Greentech Energy Systems A/S, NovEnergia II Energy & Environment (SCA) SICAR, and NovEnergia II 
Italian Portfolio SA v The Italian Republic, Final Award, 23 December 2018, para 397. 
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Achmea does not preclude intra-EU ECT arbitrations. Whilst one could criticize 
these tribunals for being too formalistic and taking too much of a textual approach, 
their approach is not in itself incorrect, and it is commendable that most of them 
engaged with EU law in quite some length. Furthermore, investment tribunals are 
known to rely heavily in their argumentation on the decisions of other investment 
tribunals. 51 This is evident in the afore-mentioned reliance by the Foresight v Spain 
Tribunal on the Masdar v Spain reasoning. Thus, once a tribunal makes an argument 
that Achmea does not preclude disputes under the ECT, it seems to have a ‘snowball 
effect’ and subsequent tribunals will rely on these arguments to substantiate and 
legitimize their own arguments.  
 
2.2.1.2  Achmea Is Not Relevant for Ongoing ICSID Cases 
Another set of arguments is used in ICSID arbitrations and concerns the 
relationship – both factual and legal – between Achmea and the ICSID Convention.  
The Tribunal in Marfin v Cyprus - an intra-EU BIT case - reminded the parties that 
its jurisdiction stemmed from both the BIT and the ICSID Convention.52 The 
principle of the irrevocability of consent, as provided in Article 25(1) ICSID 
Convention, precluded revoking consent once perfected. According to the Tribunal, 
the Claimants managed to perfect the consent - while it was still valid - by instituting 
the proceedings. Thus, the Respondent lost the right to revoke it, “especially by 
implication,” and could only withdraw it in accordance with the provisions provided 
in the BIT.53 
  In UP and CD v Hungary, an ICSID case filed under the France-Hungary 
BIT, the Tribunal emphasized the delocalized and autonomous nature of the ICSID 
legal regime, which governed the claim. Conversely, the original Achmea arbitration 
was subject to the New York Convention regime, which allows domestic courts 
broader control over the arbitral proceedings and the subsequent review of the 
arbitral award. The Tribunal in UP and CD v Hungary reminded the parties that 
Hungary had made no attempt to withdraw its consent under the ICSID 
Convention. It further refused to admit that EU law and Achmea can lead to such 
withdrawal with retroactive effect.54 Lastly, the Tribunal noted that neither state-
party to the BIT tried to re-negotiate or terminate entirely the survival clause. As a 
                                                          
51  OK Fauchald, ‘The Legal Reasoning of ICSID Tribunals – An Empirical Analysis’ (2008) 19 EJIL 
2.  
52  Marfin Investment Group v The Republic of Cyprus, ICSID Case No ARB/13/27, Award, 26 July 2018, 
para 592. 
53  Ibid., para 593. 
54  UP (formerly Le Chèque Déjeuner) and CD Holding Internationale v Hungary, ICSID Case No ARB/13/35, 
Award, 9 October 2018, para 264. 
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result, the clause kept protecting investors even if Achmea led to the termination or 
inapplicability of the BIT, as suggested by the Respondent.55 
  One may interpret these arbitral decisions as emphasizing the importance 
of consent for establishing jurisdiction under the ICSID Convention. Consent has 
a defined timeframe and requires perfection from the investor. In both cases, the 
investors instituted proceedings before the Achmea judgment. The principle of the 
irrevocability of consent under the ICSID Convention insulates the once established 
jurisdiction of the Centre from any attempts of the state to terminate or invalidate 
the international investment agreement (IIA).56 Therefore, it is hard to argue that 
Achmea has any effect on ongoing proceedings under the ICSID Convention, due 
to both the independence of such proceedings from court review and the principle 
of the irrevocability of consent. At the same time, one may equally suggest that 
Achmea might have a preclusive effect on future ICSID claims – launched after the 
Achmea judgment - to the extent that in intra-EU investment agreements it 
invalidates the open offer of the states to arbitrate.  
  Nevertheless, one ICSID decision stands out, as it speaks of the principle 
of irrevocability as being generally applicable to investment proceedings. The 
Tribunal in RREEF v Spain did not base its reasoning on any express reference to 
the ICSID Convention. Instead, it suggested that once the parties have given their 
consent, “[n]o post-hoc decision of the Court of Justice can somehow undo that 
consent once given.”57 One may try to read an implied reference to the ICSID 
Convention, as the case at hand was an ICSID case. What seems to be equally 
possible, is that the wording may signal the Tribunal’s desire to apply the principle 
of irrevocability of consent as a general principle of investment law.58 If so 
interpreted, the argument does not accord the Court of Justice’s judgment much 
weight and authority. 
 
2.2.1.3  Other Arguments Used Against Achmea  
In addition to Achmea’s non-application to the ECT and the irrevocability of consent 
argument, investment tribunals have come up with some further arguments for why 
the Achmea judgment does not affect their jurisdiction.  
The Respondent in Marfin v Cyprus pleaded the potential unenforceability of the 
award due to it contradicting EU law. However, the Tribunal decided that issues of 
                                                          
55   Ibid., para 265. 
56  Under Article 25(1) ICSID Convention, “When the parties have given their consent, no party may 
withdraw its consent unilaterally.” See Christoph H Schreuer and others, The ICSID Convention: A 
Commentary : A Commentary on the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and 
Nationals of Other States (Cambridge University Press 2009) 259. 
57  RREEF v Spain (Merits) (n 48) para 213. 
58  The fact that the chair is one of the most renowned public international scholars and a frequent 
counsel in the International Court of Justice only reinforces the presumption. 
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enforceability do not relate to the question of jurisdiction, which is governed wholly 
by the BIT and international law. The Tribunal refused to determine enforceability 
as its duty. Instead, it addressed it as a duty of domestic courts applying particular 
leges executionis.59 
  In another procedural twist, one tribunal referred en passant to the 
difference in wording in the French and English language versions of the Achmea 
judgment. In Greentech v Italy, the Tribunal noted that while the English version of 
Achmea addressed Articles 267 and 344 TFEU as “precluding provisions”,60 the 
French version referred to them as “s’opposent,” which the Tribunal interpreted as 
carrying “a notion of tension or incompatibility (as between the TFEU and BIT 
arbitration) rather than supervening illegality.”61 After concluding that Achmea is not 
preclusive to jurisdiction as a matter of principle,62 the Tribunal briefly agreed on 
the compatibility of the ECT with intra-EU ISDS. 
 
2.2.2 Tribunals that Refuse to Admit Achmea as a Jurisdictional Objection 
In some cases, investment tribunals relied on procedural reasons to not address 
Achmea, despite the effects it could potentially have on their jurisdiction and the 
outcome of the proceedings. Two such arguments are handled in this section: (a) 
the Respondent waives the jurisdictional objections based on EU law, which the 
Tribunal interprets as including Achmea, and (b) the Achmea objection was submitted 
too late.  
  Antaris v Czech Republic is a peculiar case, as it was not the Tribunal that 
refused to consider the Achmea objection, but the Respondent in its counter-
memorial expressly waived any jurisdictional objections based on EU law. The 
waiver did not mention Achmea, but referred to ‘the jurisdictional objection 
articulated by the Commission before [the] Tribunal.’63 Based on the Commission’s 
line of reasoning in other cases, one may suggest that the objection covered all issues 
of incompatibility with EU law, including the particular grounds mentioned later in 
Achmea. 
  The timeline of the proceedings can also be of crucial importance when 
deciding on the admission of new arguments or evidence. It is fair to expect that the 
proceedings should follow an established timeline as any additional interventions 
might compromise the integrity of the proceedings. In the ECT case of Antin v Spain, 
the proceedings ended a couple of weeks before the Court of Justice delivered 
                                                          
59  Marfin v Cyprus (Award) (n 52) para 596. 
60  Greentech v Italy (Final award) (n 50) para 393 referring to CJEU Slovak Republic v Achmea BV, 
ECLI:EU:C:2018:15862, para 62. 
61  Greentech v Italy (Final award) (n 50) para 394. 
62  Ibid., para 395. 
63  Antaris Solar GmbH and Dr Michael Göde v Czech Republic, PCA Case No 2014-01, Award, 2 May 
2018; para 73; see also Greentech v Italy (Final award) (n 50) para 400. 
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Achmea.64 The next day, after the judgment became public, the Respondent applied 
for the re-opening of the proceedings.65 However, the Tribunal decided to reject the 
request.66 Notably, two years earlier, the Commission requested the Tribunal to 
allow it to participate in the proceedings. The Tribunal conditioned the 
Commission’s participation on the acceptance of an undertaking on costs.67 Being 
unable to commit to such an undertaking, the Commission revoked its application 
for participation.68 
  Conversely, in Gavrilovic v Croatia, the Tribunal refused to take Achmea into 
account due to the Respondent’s late filing of the objections, even though the 
proceedings were still open.69 In 2012, the investor filed its claims under the Austria-
Croatia BIT in accordance with the ICSID Arbitration Rules. Four years later, the 
parties had two series of hearings and after another two years, the Tribunal was close 
to rendering an award. In March 2018, the Tribunal had notified the parties that the 
award would come out in a few months. However, when the Respondent decided 
to submit a ‘preliminary jurisdictional objection’ based on Achmea, under ICSID 
Arbitration Rule 41, the Tribunal dismissed it, arguing that it was filed in a non-
timely fashion.70 The justification requires a short review. 
  As a first ground, the Tribunal stated that the jurisdiction of an investment 
tribunal is not a matter of competence of the EU judicial system. Secondly, all issues 
raised in Achmea (except for the decision itself) belonged to public knowledge, 
available to the parties for years.71 The principal decision itself “is legal rather than 
factual in nature: it clarifies the law in the EU”.72 Accordingly, the Tribunal refused 
to recognize it as a new fact worth addressing in the preliminary objections. Thirdly, 
the Respondent has never raised the incompatibility argument earlier and did not 
ask for the suspension of proceedings pending the Achmea decision.73 Fourthly, the 
Tribunal referred to a specific article of the BIT, releasing the parties from any 
obligations inconsistent with the EU legal order.74 Despite its authentic character 
                                                          
64  Antin Infrastructure Services Luxembourg Sà.r.l and Antin Energia Termosolar BV v Kingdom of Spain, ICSID 
Case No ARB/13/31, Award, 15 June 2018, para 55. 
65  Ibid., para 56. 
66  Ibid., para 58. 
67  Ibid., para 64. 
68  Ibid., para 66. 
69  Georg Gavrilovic and Gavrilovic d.o.o v Republic of Croatia, ICSID Case No ARB/12/39, Decision on 
the Respondent’s Request of 4 April 2018, 30 April 2018. 
70  Ibid., para 39. 
71  Ibid., para 41. 
72  Ibid., para 42. 
73  Ibid., para 43. 
74  Agreement between the Republic of Austria and the Republic of Croatia for the Promotion and 
Protection of Investments 1997, Art 11(2): “The Contracting Parties are not bound by the present 
Agreement insofar as it is incompatible with the legal acquis of the European Union (EU) in force at 
any given time.” 
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and potential effect, the Respondent had not made use of that article in the course 
of the proceedings.75 Fifthly, the Tribunal referred to the late stage of the 
proceedings and the expectation of the award within just a few months.76 The two 
last reasons addressed a discretionary power of the Tribunal under ICSID 
Arbitration Rule 41(2) to consider late jurisdictional objections, which the Tribunal 
decided to decline.77 
  In less than three months, the Tribunal rendered a 376-page award, which 
together with the annexes totalled 757 pages.78 In the Award, the Tribunal 
recognized a claim for expropriation. However, the Tribunal declined to award any 
significant sums of the damages claimed, recognizing less than 2% of the quantum.79 
The case indicates a thin line between the questions of applicable law and the 
flexibility of the procedural setting, including the principle of the integrity of the 
proceedings and their adversary character. The failure to exercise the rights at the 
earliest convenience or at least to make necessary reservations may lead to adverse 
consequences for a party, no matter of the strength of its legal position. 
       
2.2.3 Interim Conclusions  
To conclude, there is a representative sample of cases where tribunals have assessed 
the relevance and legal effects of Achmea. Whilst Achmea is used by the Respondent 
or the Commission to target the tribunals’ jurisdiction, tribunals may accept it as a 
jurisdictional objection or reject it under various procedural grounds. One may also 
trace the formation of a jurisprudence constante concerning the relationship between 
the ECT and Achmea, the tribunals ignoring the applicability of the latter. Another 
example is the alleged non-applicability of Achmea in ICSID cases due to the 
principle of the irrevocability of consent under the ICSID Convention. Rather 
unexpectedly, even in non-ICSID cases filed under intra-EU BITs, tribunals found 
at least one ground to dismiss Achmea, due to late submission. As a result, in none 
of the observed cases did objections based on the Achmea judgment lead to the 
termination of intra-EU investment treaty arbitration cases. 
 
3 Rendering an Award When it is Unenforceable in/by one of the 
Disputing Parties  
In order to provide some analytical clarity, we need to differentiate between several 
concepts and perspectives. One is the difference between the existence of an 
international adjudicatory mechanism and the enforceability of its awards. The other 
                                                          
75  Gavrilovic v Croatia (Decision on Achmea) (n 69) para 44. 
76   Ibid., para 45. 
77   Ibid., para 46–47. 
78  Georg Gavrilovic and Gavrilovic d.o.o v Republic of Croatia, ICSID Case No ARB/12/39, Award, 26 July 
2018. 
79   Ibid., para 1318. 
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is the different perspectives one can take, depending on whether it is an EU or an 
international law perspective. 
  From the perspective of EU law, after the Achmea judgment, the very 
existence of arbitral tribunals under intra-EU BITs is precluded by EU law. In other 
words, from the perspective of EU law, awards rendered by intra-EU arbitral 
tribunals are unenforceable in the EU because the very existence of the tribunals 
that rendered them is precluded by EU law. Conversely, from the perspective of 
international law, until the contracting parties to the intra-EU BITs do not amend 
or terminate them (and the ECT), investors will be able to bring arbitral claims and 
tribunals will be validly constituted under international law. Furthermore, if the 
contracting parties do not terminate the sunset clauses, arbitral tribunals can be 
validly constituted under these agreements, even if investors bring claims following 
their termination. In other words, until the EU Member States do not act on the 
international level, these arbitral tribunals are validly constituted and deliver awards 
which can be enforced under the New York Convention or the ICSID Convention.  
Given this conundrum, the likelihood that the number of intra-EU arbitral cases 
will rise in the upcoming years is high, as signalled by the high number of pending 
cases in Annex 1. Furthermore, as the previously analysed cases clearly show, arbitral 
tribunals always find a way to uphold their jurisdiction when the Respondent or the 
Commission challenge their jurisdiction pursuant to EU law arguments. 
  This being said, the first part of this section discusses how the rendering 
of potentially unenforceable decisions by international tribunals is not specific to 
intra-EU investment disputes. We then discuss why intra-EU investment tribunals 
might uphold their jurisdiction and render an award when they know that the 
Respondent will not/cannot enforce it. 
 
3.1 It is Not Specific to Intra-EU Investment Disputes 
The rendering of a decision by an international tribunal, when it knows in the 
jurisdictional or the merits phase that one of the disputing parties will not enforce it 
or comply with it, is not restricted to investment law.  
  The South China Sea arbitration80 is a telling example. In this case, the 
Philippines unilaterally initiated compulsory arbitration pursuant to Article 287 and 
Annex VII of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) concerning 
the role of China’s ‘historic rights’ and maritime entitlements in the South China 
Sea. China unequivocally rejected the arbitration and protested by not 
participating.81 Despite China’s protests, the UNCLOS Tribunal ended up delivering 
                                                          
80  PCA, The South China Sea Arbitration (The Republic of Philippines v The People’s Republic of China), Case 
No 2013-19 < https://pca-cpa.org/en/cases/7/> accessed 1 June 2019.  
81  For a fairly one-sided, Chinese perspective on the arbitration see Chinese Society of International 
Law, ‘The South China Sea Arbitration Awards: A Critical Study’ [2018] 17 Chinese Journal of 
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a first award on jurisdiction and admissibility,82 followed by a final award on the 
merits.83 The Tribunal had done so knowing that China will most probably not 
comply with the award. Following the rendering of the final award, China 
maintained its position that the arbitration was a “political farce and the award was 
illegal, null, and void”.84 
  The Arctic Sunrise dispute, concerning the seizing of a Greenpeace ship by 
the Russian authorities, is another example of an international tribunal having to 
render a decision knowing that the Respondent state will most likely not comply 
with it. In the case brought by the Netherlands against Russia before the 
International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (provisional measures) and an Annex 
VII UNCLOS Tribunal, Russia informed both the Netherlands and ITLOS that “it 
does not accept” the Annex VII Arbitration and it did “not intend to participate” in 
the ITLOS proceedings for the prescription of provisional measures.85 Russia based 
its non-participation on a statement made upon the ratification of UNCLOS, 
according to which it does not accept procedures entailing binding decisions with 
respect to disputes “concerning law-enforcement activities in regard to the exercise 
of sovereign rights or jurisdiction”.86 Despite these objections, ITLOS ordered that 
the ship and the detained persons should be immediately released.87 The Annex VII 
Tribunal ruled that it had jurisdiction and that Russia’s declaration upon the 
ratification of UNCLOS did not exclude the dispute.88 Furthermore, Russia had to 
compensate the Netherlands, as the flagship country, for breaching UNCLOS.89 
  Another set of notable cases are the investor-state arbitrations against 
Russia arising after the Crimean Annexation. As of 2015, investors have been filing 
claims against Russia under the Russia-Ukraine BIT for the alleged interference and 
expropriation of their investments in Crimea. The Russian response to all the claims 
has been consistent over the years. According to the first available press-releases, 
                                                          
International Law 207. See also, Y Mincai, ‘China’s Responses to the Compulsory Arbitration on the 
South China Sea Dispute: Legal Effects and Policy Options’ [2014] 45 Ocean Development & 
International Law 1.  
82  The South China Sea Arbitration (n 80) Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility, 29 October 2015. 
83  The South China Sea Arbitration (n 80) Award, 12 July 2016. 
84  H Duy Phan, L Ngoc Nguyen, ‘The South China Sea Arbitration: Bindingness, Finality, and 
Compliance with UNCLOS Dispute Settlement Decisions’ [2017] 38 Asian Journal of International 
Law 36, 37.  
85  Note Verbale of the Embassy of the Russian Federation in Berlin, 22 October 2013, 
<https://www.itlos.org/fileadmin/itlos/documents/cases/case_no.22/Note_verbale_Russian_Fed
eration_eng.pdf> accessed 1 June 2019. 
86  Ibid., p 2.  
87  ITLOS, The ‘Arctic Sunrise Case’ (Kingdom of the Netherlands v Russian Federation), Provisional Measures, 
Order of 22 November 2013, p 252.  
88  PCA, The Artic Sunrise Arbitration (Netherlands v Russia), Case No 2014-02, Award on Jurisdiction, 
para 79. 
89  PCA, The Artic Sunrise Arbitration (Netherlands v Russia), Case No 2014-02, Award on Compensation, 
para 128. 
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Russia informed the PCA that it does not recognize the tribunals’ jurisdiction under 
the BIT and chooses not to appoint any representatives.90 Russia has not shown up 
in the course of the proceedings, did not attend the hearings or otherwise participate. 
Nevertheless, tribunals tend to accept jurisdiction over the investors’ claims. Some 
of them have resulted in awards on the merits against Russia.91 In all these cases, the 
tribunals faced a denial of jurisdiction by the Respondent and had to decide on the 
matter without any expectation of voluntary compliance. 
  In the case of the intra-EU investment arbitrations, the non-enforcement 
of the awards is also not hypothetical, but a reality and an obligation under EU law. 
So far, we have seen two types of incompatibility with EU law that led to the non-
enforcement of the arbitral award. Firstly, in the case of the Micula I award92 - 
rendered prior to the Achmea judgment - the arbitral tribunal itself was not deemed 
to be incompatible with EU law (at that point in time). What was deemed to be 
incompatible – by the Commission – was the compliance with the award by 
Romania, i.e. the payment of damages by Romania to an EU investor, which 
contravened EU state aid rules.93 The Romanian Constitutional Court also gave 
precedence to the primacy of EU law over Romania’s international obligations 
under ICSID.94 The second type of incompatibility – following the Achmea judgment 
- concerns the incompatibility of the tribunal itself with EU law. In such a case, the 
mere existence of the arbitral tribunal is precluded by EU law. Following the Court 
of Justice’s judgment in Achmea, the Federal Court of Germany – the court that 
made the preliminary reference to the Court of Justice - ended up setting aside the 
original Achmea award.95  
                                                          
90  Aeroport Belbek LLC and Mr Igor Valerievich Kolomoisky v The Russian Federation, PCA Case No 2015-
07, Press Release, 6 January 2016; JSC CB PrivatBank and Finance Company Finilon LLC v The Russian 
Federation, PCA Case No 2015-21, Press release, 30 March 2016; LLC Lugzor et al v The Russian 
Federation, PCA Case No 2015-29, Press Release, 13 December 2017; PJSC Ukrnafta v The Russian 
Federation, PCA Case No 2015-34, Press Release, 2 May 2016; Stabil LLC et al v The Russian Federation, 
PCA Case No 2015-35, Press Release, 2 May 2016; Everest Estate LLC et al v The Russian Federation, 
PCA Case No 2015-36, Press Release, 9 August 2016; NJSC Naftogaz of Ukraine (Ukraine) et al v The 
Russian Federation, PCA Case No 2017-16. 
91  Everest Estate LLC et al v The Russian Federation, PCA Case 2015-36, Press Release, 9 May 2018; 
Aeroport Belbek LLC and Mr Igor Valerievich Kolomoisky v The Russian Federation, PCA Case No 2015-07, 
Press Release, 15 February 2019; JSC CB PrivatBank and Finance Company Finilon LLC v The Russian 
Federation, PCA Case No 2015-21, Press Release, 15 February 2019. 
92  Ioan Micula et.al. v Romania, ICSID Case no ARB/05/20, Final Award, 11 December 2013. 
93  EC Decision 2015/1470 of 30 March 2015 on State aid SA.38517 (2014/C) (ex 2014/NN) 
implemented by Romania – arbitral award Micula v Romania of 11 December 2013, OJ L 232, 43. 
94  Constitutional Court of Romania (Curtea Constituțională a României), Decision No 887 of 15 
December 2015 (‘Micula and European Food’).  
95  Federal Court of Germany (Bundesgerichtshof), Case I ZB 2/15, Decision of 24 January 2019. See S 
Schwalb and S Arzner, ‘The German Federal Court of Justice rules in Achmea - entry into the EU 
renders Slovakia's offer for Intra-EU arbitration inapplicable’ [2019] 
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  In the next section the paper looks at why international tribunals render 
awards which are very likely not to be enforced/complied with by the Respondent 
state. 
 
3.2  Why Do International Tribunals Uphold their Jurisdiction when they 
Render Potentially Unenforceable Awards? 
Whilst different in many ways – the subject area, the applicable legal rules, the 
procedure, the tribunals – the common element in the South China Sea case, the Arctic 
Sunrise case, the investment arbitrations arising out of the Crimean dispute, and the 
post-Achmea intra-EU arbitrations is that the tribunals in the jurisdictional phase 
already knew that the Respondent (most likely) will not enforce the awards or 
comply with them. The tactics used by the Respondents differed. China did not 
participate in the arbitration and initiated a campaign to undermine the credibility 
of the UNCLOS Tribunal, Russia sent a note verbale to ITLOS and the Netherlands 
concerning its non-participation, whilst the EU Member States participated in the 
arbitrations brought against them and raised legal arguments against the tribunals’ 
jurisdiction. The outcomes were the same: the tribunals upheld their jurisdiction and 
decided on the merits.  
  The question is why tribunals choose to uphold their jurisdiction when it 
is almost certain that the respondents will not comply with their decisions or enforce 
the awards. This question is even more important if one accepts the traditional view 
that compliance is central to the effectiveness and legitimacy of international law 
and adjudication.96 However, as Davenport argues - in the context of the South China 
Sea Arbitration and using the ICJ’s Nicaragua judgment against the USA as an 
example - the decision of an international tribunal has value, even if it is not 
complied with, such as enhancing the legitimacy of the system, interpreting the law, 
shaping future negotiations between the disputing parties, and impacting other state 
and non-state actors.97 Therefore, in the following, we argue that several reasons 
exist - depending on whether one takes a more conservative, dogmatic view or a law 
in context approach - as to why intra-EU investment tribunals still go forward with 
their decisions.  
                                                          
<https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=a7e2bce4-8334-4fcb-a397-61709c3b095d>, 
accessed 1 June 2019. 
96  Y Shany, Assessing the Effectiveness of International Courts (OUP 2014) 117. Shany takes the view that 
judgment-compliance “is not a reliable indicator of judicial effectiveness” p 118. For a discussion of 
why states comply with international law, see A Guzman, How International Law Works: A Rational Choice 
Theory’ (OUP 2008) who coins the expression the “Three Rs of Compliance”: reciprocity, retaliation 
ad reputation.  
97  T Davenport, ‘Why the South China Sea Arbitration Case Matters (Even if China Ignores It)’ 
[2016] The Diplomat, 8 July 2016 < https://thediplomat.com/2016/07/why-the-south-china-sea-
arbitration-case-matters-even-if-china-ignores-it/> accessed 1 June 2019. 
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  Firstly, one can take a more dogmatic view and argue that the intra-EU 
tribunals did nothing more than read and interpret the legal rules granting them 
jurisdiction, which allowed them to conclude that they had jurisdiction. Thus, such 
tribunals derive their jurisdiction from international agreements which are still valid 
under international law, and the EU treaties have not replaced or superseded the 
intra-EU BITs when newer states joined the EU. However, when every, 
independently constituted intra-EU tribunal comes to the same conclusion – 
affirming their jurisdiction – even when the cases are different and the legal 
arguments being raised differ, then one wonders if the outcome is really based only 
on what the law allows them to conclude. As Koutrakos noted in the intra-EU BIT 
context prior to Achmea, intra-EU investment tribunals take an unduly formalistic view 
on the matter of jurisdiction and only focus on the narrow issue of compliance with 
international law, disregarding the complexities faced by ‘national courts […] called 
upon to enforce the award whilst they […] struggle to identify their obligations 
under parallel and interacting sets of rules’.98 Whilst this might be the case for 
intra-EU BITs, it is hard to argue that the South China Sea or Arctic Sunrise Tribunals 
took an unduly formalistic attitude towards their jurisdiction under UNCLOS, when 
the respondents did not even participate in the disputes to raise legal arguments 
against the jurisdiction of those tribunals..  
  Secondly, one could argue that the tribunals might interpret their 
jurisdiction more broadly or narrowly depending on the effectiveness of the 
enforcement/compliance mechanism of the legal regime they operate in. Thus, 
international tribunals will interpret their jurisdiction narrowly if they know that 
compliance with their decision or its enforcement is only dependent on the 
Respondent state. Conversely, tribunals will interpret their jurisdiction broadly if 
compliance or enforcement is not solely dependent on the Respondent state. For 
example, investment law has quite an effective enforcement mechanism, via the 
New York and ICSID Conventions. Thus, in an ICSID arbitration, the investor can 
seek to enforce its award in any member of the ICSID Convention. In other words, 
if the respondent State fails to enforce the award, the investors can seek 
enforcement in another ICSID member, just like the Micula brothers sought 
enforcement in US courts.99  
  It follows that intra-EU tribunals might be willing to interpret their 
jurisdiction expansively and disregard Achmea, because they know that their awards 
are enforceable in non-EU countries, even if the EU Member States argue that they 
cannot enforce the awards due to EU legal impediments. Nonetheless, we see the 
                                                          
98  P Koutrakos, ‘The Relevance of EU Law for Arbitral Tribunals: (Not) Managing the Lingering 
Tensions’ [2016] 17 JWIT 873, 880.  
99  For example, US District Court for the District of Columbia, Viorel Micula v The Government of 
Romania, Civil No 1:14-cv-00600, Decision on the Claimant’s Motion to confirm the ICSID Award.  
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opposite in the South China Sea dispute. Even if the Tribunal knew that compliance 
with the award by an objecting member of the UN Security Council will likely be 
impossible and there was no other effective means of enforcement, it still upheld its 
jurisdiction and decided the case.100 Furthermore, as previously discussed, the 
investment tribunal in Marfin v Cyprus decided that issues of enforceability do not 
relate to the question of jurisdiction, governed wholly by the BIT and international 
law, and it refused to determine enforceability as its duty.101 Thus, at least for some 
international tribunals, the effectiveness of the compliance or enforcement 
mechanism does not seem to influence how broadly they interpret their jurisdiction.  
  Thirdly, as Shany notes, it might also be that international courts “hungry 
for cases or eager to advance a certain normative agenda may read their jurisdictional 
powers in an expansive manner”.102 To what extent this might be the case for intra-
EU BITs is hard to tell. On the one hand, one can argue that investment tribunals 
cannot be hungry for more cases, since – unlike standing international courts – they 
are only set up to adjudicate a specific case, after which they are dissolved. On the 
other hand, it could be argued that arbitrators – some of whom are repeatedly 
appointed103 – want to send a signal to investors that despite the Achmea decision, 
investor-state arbitration is a viable dispute resolution mechanism and the system is 
apt to hear potential cases. This idea does not seem that farfetched. As Fauchald’s 
empirical analysis from 2008 shows, ICSID tribunals have a tendency of developing 
a homogenous methodology – despite their ad hoc nature and the heterogeneous 
legal sources based on which they have to solve legal disputes – using case law from 
other investment tribunals as their main interpretative argument.104 We see the same 
tendency in the intra-EU BIT cases as well (both pre and post-Achmea) in which 
tribunals often rely on arguments used by previous tribunals to dismiss the 
objections to their jurisdiction based on EU law and the Achmea judgment.105  
  Fourthly, some goals of international tribunals seem to be common to all 
judicial institutions, goals such as a normative agenda, “dispute resolution, problem 
solving, regime support, and legitimation.”106 One can thus argue that the intra-EU 
tribunals are willing to uphold their jurisdiction even after Achmea because their 
primary role is to solve the dispute between an investor and the host State, as well 
as to interpret and clarify the law.107 Whether or not compliance and enforcement 
                                                          
100  As Phan and Nguyen point out, compliance with UNCLOS arbitrations is quite high, with only 
the Arctic Sunrise and South China Sea disputes as exceptions. See Phan and Nguyen (n 84) 47. 
101  Marfin v Cyprus (Award) (n 52) para 596. 
102  Shany (n 96) 79.   
103  See M Langford, D Behn and R Lie, ‘The Revolving Door in International Investment Arbitration’ 
[2017] 20(2) Journal of International Economic Law 301. 
104  See Fauchald (n 51).  
105  See n 46; the Foresight v Spain Tribunal referred to the arguments of the Masdar v Spain Tribunal. 
106  Shany (n 96) 123.  
107  See also Davenport (n 97). 
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can be achieved, does not affect the main task of investment tribunals: the 
settlement of investor-State disputes (see the Marfin v Cyprus Tribunal) and the 
interpretation of the law. Furthermore, the Court of Justice’s Achmea ruling in 
essence questions the very existence of such tribunals; a regional court, deriving its 
jurisdiction from another set of international treaties, is telling another international 
tribunal (even if just ad hoc) that their very existence under a different set of 
international treaties is precluded by the former set of treaties. Thus, one should not 
be surprised that in an effort to legitimize the investment law system based on which 
they operate, intra-EU tribunals will push back against Achmea. This push-back is 
most evident in RREEF v Spain in which the Tribunal went as far as to criticize the 
part of the Achmea judgment in which the Court of Justice differentiates between 
commercial and investment treaty arbitration.108 Henceforth, even if on the surface 
most investment tribunals take account of the Court of Justice’s judgment and 
engage with EU law, their ultimate decision is not affected by it.  
  Fifthly, ad hoc tribunals do not have security of tenure as standing tribunals 
do and the remuneration of their members will depend on each individual case. 
More so, depending on the institutional rules under which the arbitration is 
conducted, arbitrators might receive their remuneration after different stages of the 
proceedings. In other words, the longer the proceedings the more remuneration 
they will get. Thus, one could argue that it makes more sense to uphold jurisdiction 
and continue a case if this affects the remuneration of the arbitrators.  
  In conclusion, intra-EU investment tribunals can have various reasons to 
uphold their jurisdiction and decide on the merits, even if they know that following 
the Achmea judgment, the Respondent states will not be able to enforce their awards. 
The most compelling reason seems to be the one evoked by the Marfin v Cyprus 
Tribunal. Enforceability is a separate issue from jurisdiction. Thus, in the 
jurisdictional phase a tribunal should decide based on the law in front of it, and not 
whether the decision will be enforced or complied with.  
 
4 The Way Forward?  
From the perspective of the effective administration of justice the present situation 
is clearly untenable. Two different judicial fora have opposite views on the same 
matter: according to the Court of Justice the very existence of intra-EU investment 
tribunals is precluded by EU law, while the arbitral tribunals disagree with the Court 
of Justice and uphold their jurisdiction on international law grounds. As Witte notes: 
 
… neither system with its respective adjudicative body can forcefully 
subordinate the other to its will. Although either system with its 
                                                          
108  RREEF v Spain (n 48) Decision on Responsibility and on the Principles of Quantum, para 213.   
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respective adjudicative body maintains its claim to supremacy, the 
reality of their relationship is one of heterarchy.109 
 
The effects of the tension between EU and investment law, however, do not stop 
at the disagreement of two adjudicative bodies or at the level of academic debates. 
For investors, host States, and national courts – both EU and non-EU - the status 
quo creates uncertainties. Investors that won the arbitration and are awarded 
compensation, cannot enforce it in 28 EU Member States, so they have to spend 
extra time and resources to enforce the awards in non-EU countries, without the 
guarantee of success.110 National courts are also put in a delicate position. EU 
national courts must choose between two competing legal obligations: those under 
EU law and those under their investment agreements, as well as the ICSID and New 
York Conventions. Under EU law, they will have to grant primacy to their EU law 
obligations. Non-EU courts, such as those of the United States, are then asked to 
tackle the enforcement of such awards. This in turn exposes them to the murky and 
muddied waters of the relationship of these agreements with the internal legal order 
of another international actor. EU Member States are also in a position of not 
knowing whether or not to continue challenging the jurisdiction of intra-EU 
investment tribunals or simply move forward with the arbitration.111 Later on, if they 
choose to enforce the arbitral awards, they will contravene EU law and risk an 
infringement case, as the example of Romania shows in the Micula I case.  
  In the following we argue that in the interest of the effective administration 
of justice112 investment tribunals could give more weight to the Achmea judgment 
and decline their jurisdiction as a sign of judicial comity. Otherwise, they could still 
uphold their jurisdiction, but decline the case as inadmissible for the interest of 
upholding the effective administration of justice. We of course realise that in light 
of what we have seen so far, most of these proposals will remain at the theoretical 
level.  
 
                                                          
109  I Witte, ‘Interaction between International Investment Law and Constitutional Law: Promoting 
the Dialogue. A European Perspective on Judicial Cooperation and Deference’ [2018] 21(1) Max 
Planck Yearbook of United National Law Online 469, 516. On legal heterarchy see D Halberstam, 
‘Constitutional Heterarchy: The Centrality of Conflict in the European Union and the United States’, 
in JL Dunoff and JP Trachtman (eds), Ruling the World? Constitutionalism, International Law and Global 
Governance (CUP 2009).  
110  See, for example, USDC for the District of Columbia, Novenegia II v Kingdom of Spain Civil Action 
No. 1:18-cv-1148 in which the investor is seeking to confirm an arbitral award against Spain. See US 
District Court for the District of Columbia, Viorel Micula v The Government of Romania (n 99) in which 
the US court denied the investors’ petition to confirm the ICSID Award.  
111  See (n 63) the waiver of the jurisdiction objections by the Czech Republic.  
112  For this idea see Caroline Henckels, ‘Overcoming Jurisdictional Isolationism at the WTO – FTA 
Nexus: A Potential Approach to the WTO’ [2008] 19(3) EJIL 571.  
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4.1  Judicial Comity. Doubtful it will Work 
The interaction between EU law and investment law is not new to academic debates. 
Recently, Witte argued in favour of judicial dialogue following a ‘heterarchical 
conceptualization’ of the relationship between the two fields of law, which: 
 
…should further prompt investment tribunals to abstain from isolationist 
constructions of international investment law because only decisions that 
engage in the difficult exercise of balancing conflicting interests can find 
constitutional acceptance.113 
 
This proposal – made prior to the delivery of the Achmea judgment – cannot, 
however, adequately address the post-Achmea reality. The very existence of these 
tribunals is precluded by or is incompatible with - depending on which translation 
of the judgment one follows - EU law. Thus, no amount of balancing of conflicting 
interests by intra-EU tribunals will gain constitutional acceptance by the Court of 
Justice. Furthermore, some judicial dialogue has already occurred at the level of 
judicial engagement. We have seen that some intra-EU tribunals, especially the one 
in Vattenfall, have extensively considered EU law and Achmea, without declining their 
jurisdiction. Therefore, we believe that - given the current situation - dialogue might 
not be sufficient to solve the conundrum and instead we look at whether judicial 
comity could provide some guidance (albeit with the reservation that in practice 
tribunals probably will not consider it).  
  According to the Oxford Reference definition, ‘judicial comity’ refers to 
the “principle that, out of deference and respect, the courts in one state or 
jurisdiction will give effect to the laws and judicial decisions of another”.114 As 
Henckels notes, “it allows a court to decline to exercise jurisdiction over matters 
that would be more appropriately heard by another tribunal,” but it does not impose 
a legal obligation on tribunals.115 
  This concept is not alien to international law. The MOX Plant dispute 
between Ireland and the United Kingdom, concerning the deposit of nuclear waste 
                                                          
113  Witte (n 109) 519.  
114  Oxford Reference 
<http://www.oxfordreference.com/view/10.1093/oi/authority.20110803100026381> accessed 1 
June 2019; See JR Paul, ‘Comity in International Law ’ [1991] 32(1) Harvard Int’l LJ 2. One could also 
draw parallels with the common law doctrine of forum non conveniens, a conflict of laws doctrine that 
applies between courts in different jurisdictions in the same country or between courts of different 
countries.    
115  Henckels (n 112) 584. Swarabowicz pleads for the consolidation of investment cases according to 
private law rules, see M Swarabowicz, ‘Identity of Claims in Investment Arbitration: A Plea for Unity 
of the Legal System’ [2017] 8 Journal of International Dispute Settlement 280. 
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close to the Irish Sea, ended up before three international/regional tribunals: the 
Court of Justice of the EU,116 an UNCLOS Annex VII Tribunal,117 and a Tribunal 
constituted under the OSPAR Convention.118 The UNCLOS Annex VII arbitration 
is the posterchild of judicial comity between two different international courts. The 
Tribunal suspended the proceedings based on the principle of mutual respect and 
comity until a pending issue that affected the tribunal’s jurisdiction was handled by 
the Court of Justice.  
  One could argue that in the interest of the effective administration of 
justice, intra-EU tribunals (both those based on the ECT and BITs) could, pursuant 
to the principle of mutual respect and comity, decline their jurisdiction. Henckels 
argues that tribunals possess the inherent power to find that they do not have 
jurisdiction in a case and to decline to exercise it.119 This, however, has yet to happen 
in intra-EU cases (and we are doubtful that it will), even in cases in which the MOX 
Plant arbitration was relied on by the Respondent.  
  In the UP and CD v Hungary arbitration - commenced under the France-
Hungary BIT - the tribunal had to consider whether the MOX Plant arbitration120 
under UNCLOS could give it guidance. The Tribunal succinctly concluded that 
MOX Plant “provides no useful guidance in view of the considerable differences 
between that case and the present one”.121 According to the Tribunal, the two cases 
differ because in MOX Plant the EU was a party to UNCLOS, there was a risk of 
future conflicting decisions, and the MOX Plant Tribunal in the end did not decide 
on its jurisdiction because Ireland withdrew its claim.122  
  The decision of the Tribunal is not without criticism. The Tribunal takes 
an overly formalistic reading of MOX Plant and why it was relevant to the case. It 
was relevant because it was an example of how one tribunal can act – suspending 
the proceedings- when its jurisdiction might be/is affected by another international 
tribunal. Thus, the essence of both cases was similar. Furthermore, since the EU is 
a party to the ECT, it would follow from the Tribunal’s logic that the MOX Plant 
case would be applicable to ECT cases.  
  In the original Achmea v Slovakia arbitration, the Respondent and the 
Commission also raised the argument of judicial comity pursuant to the Mox Plant 
                                                          
116  CJEU C-459/03, Commission v Ireland [2006] ECLI:EU:C:2006:345.  
117  PCA, UNCLOS Arbitral Tribunal, The MOX Plant Case (Ireland v. United Kingdom), PCA Case 2002-
01, Order of 24 June 2003. See N Lavranos, ‘The Epilogue in the MOX Plant Dispute: An End Without 
Findings’ [2009] 18(1) European Energy and Environmental Law Review 180. 
118  PCA, OSPAR Arbitral Tribunal (MOX Plant), (Ireland v United Kingdom), PCA Case NO 2001-03, 
Final Award, 2 July 2003. 
119  Henckels (112) 583. 
120  PCA, UNCLOS Arbitral Tribunal, The MOX Plant Case (n 117).  
121  UP and DC v Hungary, ICSID Case No ARB/13/35, Award, 9 October 2018, para 276.  
122  Ibid., paras 277-279. 
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arbitration123 and advised the Tribunal to follow the MOX Plant Tribunal and 
suspend the proceedings. The Tribunal ended up not addressing this argument.  
  Prior to Achmea, Koutrakos argued that investment tribunals would either 
engage or not engage with EU law at all. He gave the example of the tribunal in 
EURAM v Slovakia124 as an illustration of the tribunal’s engagement with and 
understanding of EU law, even if in the end the tribunal upheld its jurisdiction. 
Whilst this example is commendable, the empirical part of this paper clearly shows 
that so far in none of the pre and post-Achmea cases did the tribunals relinquish their 
jurisdiction pursuant to objections based on EU law. Thus, whether or not a tribunal 
engages with EU law makes little practical difference if they still uphold their 
jurisdiction. In other words, engagement with EU law that is not followed by a 
relinquishment of jurisdiction is not enough to provide more legal certainty and 
coherence.  
  There are some further issues to consider as well with the proposal that 
intra-EU tribunals should decline their jurisdiction based on judicial comity. Firstly, 
what is the benefit of this approach and to whom? One can of course argue, as we 
have previously done, that this would benefit the effective administration of justice 
and it would provide legal certainty. The counter argument to this, is that it will not 
benefit investors who expect that a certain level of protection is offered to them by 
IIAs. They have a right to initiate a claim, granted to them by sovereign states 
pursuant to an international treaty, and the Tribunal would deprive them from that 
right by declining its jurisdiction. On the other hand, it can also be argued that by 
going forward with the case, intra-EU tribunals help create more uncertainty for the 
investors. Probably not many investors want to spend millions of dollars on 
expensive, multi-year arbitrations (the average of which takes 4 years),125 just to find 
out that the award is unenforceable. Whilst outside-EU enforcement is possible 
under ICSID, there is no conclusive empirical evidence of how many of the 
enforcement cases launched by the investors before third-country courts have 
proven to be successful. 
  Secondly, the UP and CD v Hungary Tribunal raised the question of which 
neutral forum would be competent to hear the dispute in the eventually that it 
                                                          
123  PCA Eureko (Achmea) v Slovakia, Case No 2008-13, Award on Jurisdiction, Arbitrability and 
Suspension, 26 October 2010, paras 195 and 203. 
124  Koutrakos (n 98) 881, with reference to EURAM v Slovakia, PCA Case No 2010–17, Award on 
Jurisdiction, 22 October 2012. 
125  A Sinclair, ‘ICSID arbitration: How Long Does it Take?’ [2009] 4(5) Global Arbitration Review 
(115 ICSID cases took on average 3.63 years); Allen & Overy, ‘Investment Treaty Arbitration: Cost, 
Duration and Size of Claims all Show Steady Increase’ [2017] (324 cases took on average 3.8 years) 
<http://www.allenovery.com/publications/en-gb/Pages/Investment-Treaty-Arbitration-cost-
duration-and-size-of-claims-all-show-steady-increase.aspx ISA> accessed 1 June 2019; Joongi Kim, 
‘Streamlining the ICSID Process: New Statistical Insights and Comparative Lessons from Other 
Institutions’ [2004] 11(1) Transnat’l Dispute Mgmt. 2 (on average 4.1 years). 
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declined jurisdiction because the Respondent failed to show that the Claimants 
would have standing before the domestic courts. Furthermore, the “vague principle” 
of mutual trust that applies between EU Member States and their courts, is 
inapplicable to investment tribunals.126  
  The question of which neutral forum would hear the dispute in case the 
investment tribunals were to decline their jurisdiction has both a legal and a factual 
component to it. If the treaty has a fork-in-the-road clause127 or a non-U turn 
clause,128 then the investor could technically not rely anymore on domestic courts.129 
In reality, however, fork-in-the-road clauses are easy to circumvent.  In order for 
this clause to properly operate one would need an identity of the facts, the disputing 
parties and the legal rules invoked. In most cases, however, the domestic dispute is 
brought by a different legal entity than the international one, the facts of the 
domestic case differ, as well as the legal rules invoked in the case.130 Thus, if intra-
EU investment tribunals were to decline their jurisdiction, the investors could still 
bring a case before domestic courts, the latter being a fairly widespread option even 
when investor have the opportunity to resort to investment treaty arbitration.131  
  In conclusion, whilst judicial comity that results in a declination of 
jurisdiction in favour of EU courts (both national and EU level) might seem to be 
a more far-reaching solution, than judicial dialogue in the form of judicial 
engagement, we believe that in practice – as already shown by two cases – intra-EU 
tribunals will not follow this approach.  
 
4.2  Uphold the Jurisdiction but Declare the Case Inadmissible? 
The second proposal we discuss is a bit more controversial as it relies on 
differentiating between jurisdiction and admissibility. Whilst the difference between 
the two is a debated topic and academics differ132 as to where the separation between 
the two lies, we take the views expounded by Shany and Reinisch to differentiate 
between the two concepts. According to Shany, the jurisdiction of a court – dictating 
who can access the court, when, which issues can be litigated, etc. – is set out in the 
                                                          
126  UP and DC v Hungary, ICSID Case No ARB/13/35, Award, 9 October 2018, para 222. 
127  Fork-in-the-road clauses require the investor to decide whether it chooses domestic courts or ITA, 
prohibiting it to have recourse to the other forum once it has made its choice. 
128  ‘No-U-turn’ clauses forbid the investor to resort to domestic courts, once it has opted for ITA. 
129  UNCTAD, ‘Investor-State Dispute Settlement’ [2014] UNCTAD Series on Issues in International 
Investment Agreements III, 86-87 
<https://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/diaeia2013d2_en.pdf> accessed 1 June 2019. 
130  See Sz Gáspár-Szilágyi, ‘Why Do or Should Foreign Investors Resort to the Courts of the Host 
Country Prior to Investment Treaty Arbitration?’ in OK Fauchald, D Behn, MLangford (eds), The 
Legitimacy of Investment Arbitration. Empirical Perspectives (forthcoming, CUP 2019/2020). 
131  Ibid.  
132  See V Heiskanen, ‘Comments on Andrea Marco Steingruber’s Remarks on Veijo Heiskanen’s Note 
‘Ménage a Trois? Jurisdiction, Admissibility and Competence in Investment Treaty Arbitration’ [2014] 
29(3) ICSID Rev 669. 
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constitutive documents of the court. Traditionally, one speaks of four facets of 
jurisdiction: ratione materiae, ratione temporae, ratione personae, and ratione loci.133 
Admissibility, on the other hand, denotes a court’s discretionary power to admit a 
specific case or not; the power to decline hearing the case even when it has affirmed 
jurisdiction.134 Thus, in the words of Reinisch “[i]n this sense, jurisdiction is a 
primary issue which has to be affirmed first; and admissibility may be a secondary 
issue that only arises once a tribunal has affirmed its jurisdiction.”135  
  Based on the above, one could argue that an intra-EU tribunal could fist 
uphold its jurisdiction, despite the objections based on Achmea, but then decide that 
the case is inadmissible. However, based on what ground(s) could an intra-EU 
tribunal do so? According to Shany, “rules on admissibility allow courts to engage 
in some degree of case selection according to their internal policy preferences and in 
response to external expectations [emphasis added].”136 Therefore, the grounds for 
declining admissibility would be at the discretion of the tribunals. 
  Some international courts dismiss a case on the basis of ‘external’ legal 
rules, which are not found in the constitutive instruments of the court. This may 
suggest “that an international court [can regard] the need to protect the systemic 
welfare of international law as a worthy goal that must be pursued”.137 International 
courts have also upheld “their right to decline jurisdiction in circumstances where 
the exercise of [it] would have run contrary to a legal principle”.138 Could one argue 
that ‘effective administration of justice’ is such a principle or an ‘external’ legal rule?  
In light of what we have seen, an argument could be made that the current tangled 
web of national, supranational and international procedures does not ensure the 
effective administration of justice. Thus, intra-EU tribunals – instead of declining 
their jurisdiction based on EU law and Achmea - could continue upholding their 
jurisdiction based on the IIAs. This would ensure that the way in which jurisdiction 
is upheld in investment law is consistent within the system. Nevertheless, once 
jurisdiction is upheld, they could decline to admit the case pursuant to the need to 
ensure the effective administration of justice. We are of course aware that this is a 
longshot as “international courts sometimes tend to retain cases when they face a 
strong institutional interest in doing so, even in the face of jurisdictional 
competition.”139 
                                                          
133  Shany (n 96) 67-68. 
134  Shany (n 96) 84.  
135  August Reinisch, ‘Jurisdiction and Admissibility in International Law’ [2017] 16 JWIT 21, 24. 
136  Shany (n 96) 68.  
137  Shany (n 96) 87.  
138  Shany (n 96) 86 with reference to Rights of Minorities in Upper Silesia (Minority Schools) (Germany v 
Poland) [1928] PCIJ Series A No 15, 23 and Case of the Monetary Gold Removed from Rome in 1943 (Italy v 
France, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and United States of America) (Preliminary 
Question) [1954] ICJ Rep 19, 32. 
139  Shany (n 96) 94. 
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  In conclusion, upholding their jurisdiction and then dismissing the case 
based on the effective administration of justice could help the intra-EU tribunals to 
continue past practice relating to the effects of EU law on their jurisdiction – thus 
safeguarding the coherence of the investment law system – and it would also ensure 
that they would be perceived as a more legitimate system. Nevertheless, the 
likelihood that in practice they will adopt this approach is very low.  
 
4 Conclusion 
Following the Court of Justice’s recent Achmea judgment, there is already a 
representative sample of cases in which intra-EU investment tribunals have assessed 
the relevance and legal effects of Achmea. The number of pending cases is staggering 
and will continue to rise, ensuring that the relationship between the EU legal order 
and Achmea, on the one hand, and the Energy Charter Treaty and intra-EU BITs, 
on the other, will remain topical in the years to come.  
  Whilst Achmea is used by the Respondents or the Commission to object to 
the tribunals’ jurisdiction, tribunals have so far consistently rejected these objections 
and have upheld their jurisdiction. The reasons vary among the tribunals, but one 
can already observe the formation of a jurisprudence constante concerning the 
relationship between the ECT and Achmea, the tribunals ignoring the applicability 
of the latter. Another example is the alleged non-applicability of Achmea in ICSID 
cases due to the principle of the irrevocability of consent under the ICSID 
Convention.  
  The reasons why intra-EU tribunals uphold their jurisdiction, even when 
they know that their awards cannot be enforced in the EU, are varied. The most 
compelling reason seems to be the one evoked by the Marfin v Cyprus Tribunal. 
Enforceability is a separate issue from jurisdiction. Thus, in the jurisdictional phase 
a tribunal should decide based on the law in front of it, and not whether the decision 
will be enforced or complied with. 
  The present situation, however, is clearly untenable. Even where some 
form of judicial dialogue exists, in the form of arbitral tribunals engaging with EU 
law and Achmea, the results are the same: intra-EU tribunals uphold their 
jurisdiction, render and award that is unenforceable in the EU, and investors then 
have to try enforcing the awards before third-country courts. One could argue that 
intra-EU tribunals could decline to exercise their jurisdiction in favour of EU courts 
(both national and EU level) as a sign of judicial comity. If this option is not suitable, 
then they could continue upholding their jurisdiction and then dismiss the case 
based on the need to ensure the effective administration of justice. The latter option 
could help intra-EU tribunals continue past practice relating to the effects of EU 
law on their jurisdiction – thus safeguarding the coherence of the investment law 
system – and it would also ensure that they would be perceived as a more legitimate 
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system. Nevertheless, the likelihood that in practice they will adopt either of these 
approaches is very low. It seems that the only way the situation will be clarified is 
when the EU Member States terminate the intra-EU BITs with their sunset clauses 
and amend the ECT. However, these drastic measures will not affect pending cases.  
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Annex 1. Chronological Index of Post-Achmea, Concluded or Pending intra-EU Investment Arbitrations 
  
N Short Name Legal Ref. IIA Status Year of 
Decision 
Achmea 
discussed? 
1 Juvell & Bithell v. Poland ICC CY-PO BIT Concluded 2019 N/A 
2 Gavrilovic v Croatia  ICSID ARB/12/39 AT-CR BIT Concluded 2018 No 
3 Marfin v Cyprus ICSID ARB/13/27 CY-GR BIT Concluded 2018 Yes 
4 RREEF v Spain ICSID ARB/13/30 ECT Concluded 2019 Yes 
5 Antin v Spain ICSID ARB/13/31 ECT Concluded 2018 No 
6 UP and CD v Hungary ICSID ARB/13/35 FR-HU BIT Concluded 2018 Yes 
7 Masdar v Spain ICSID ARB/14/1 ECT Concluded 2018 Yes 
8 NextEra v Spain ICSID ARB/14/11 ECT Concluded 2019 N/A 
9 Sodexo v Spain ICSID ARB/14/20 FR-HU BIT Concluded 2019 N/A 
10 Alpiq v. Romania ICSID ARB/14/28 RO-CH BIT, ECT Concluded 2018 N/A 
11 B3 Croatian Courier v. Croatia ICSID ARB/15/5 CR-NL BIT Concluded 2019 N/A 
12 ENGIE v. Hungary ICSID ARB/16/14 ECT Concluded 2018 N/A 
13 A11Y v Czech Republic ICSID UNCT/15/1 UK-CZ BIT Concluded 2018 No 
14 Darley Energy v. Poland (Darley I) PCA UK-PL BIT Concluded 2018 N/A 
15 Antaris v Spain PCA No. 2014-01 DE-SK BIT, ECT Concluded  2018 No 
16 Greentech v Italy SCC 2015/095 ECT Concluded 2018 Yes 
17 Athena/Greentech v Spain SCC 2015/150 ECT Concluded 2018 Yes 
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18 Austrian Investors v. Poland Ad hoc AT-PO BIT Pending  N/A 
19 ICW v. Czech Republic Ad hoc CZ-UK BIT, ECT Pending  N/A 
20 Photovoltaik v. Czech Republic Ad hoc CZ-GE BIT, ECT Pending  N/A 
21 Voltaic v. Czech Republic Ad hoc CZ-GE BIT, ECT Pending  N/A 
22 Europa Nova v. Czech Republic Ad hoc CY-CZ BIT, ECT Pending  N/A 
23 Cypriot Investor v. Poland Ad hoc CY-PO BIT Pending  N/A 
24 Cordoba v. Spain Ad hoc ECT Pending  N/A 
25 AMF Aircraft v. Czech Republic Ad hoc CZ-GE BIT Pending  N/A 
26 EDF v. Spain Ad hoc ECT Pending  N/A 
27 Honwood v. Poland (Darley II) ICC CY-PO BIT Pending  N/A 
28 Vattenfall v. Germany (Vattenfall II) ICSID ARB/12/12 ECT Pending  Yes 
29 Grassetto v. Slovenia ICSID ARB/13/10 SI-IT BIT Pending  N/A 
30 EVN v. Bulgaria ICSID ARB/13/17 AU-BG BIT, ECT Pending  N/A 
31 MOL v. Croatia ICSID ARB/13/32 ECT Pending  N/A 
32 InfraRed v Spain ICSID ARB/14/12 ECT Pending    N/A 
33 Cyprus Popular Bank Public Co. Ltd. v. 
Greece 
ICSID ARB/14/16 CY-GR BIT Pending  N/A 
34 Renenergy v Spain ICSID ARB/14/18 ECT Pending    N/A 
35 United Utilities v. Estonia ICSID ARB/14/24 NE-EST BIT Pending  N/A 
36 Micula v. Romania (Micula II) ICSID ARB/14/29 SE-RO BIT Pending  N/A 
37 RWE v Spain ICSID ARB/14/34 ECT Pending    N/A 
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38 Stadtwerke v. Spain ICSID ARB/15/1 ECT Pending  N/A 
39 9REN v. Spain ICSID ARB/15/15 ECT Pending  N/A 
40 KS Invest v Spain ICSID ARB/15/15 ECT Pending    N/A 
41 BayWa r.e. v Spain ICSID ARB/15/16 ECT Pending    N/A 
42 Cube Infrastructure v. Spain ICSID ARB/15/20 ECT Pending  N/A 
43 Kruck v Spain ICSID ARB/15/25 ECT Pending    N/A 
44 JGC v. Spain ICSID ARB/15/27 ECT Pending  N/A 
45 Gabriel Resources v. Romania ICSID ARB/15/31 CA-RO BIT; 
UK-RO BIT 
Pending  Yes 
46 Cavalum v. Spain ICSID ARB/15/34 ECT Pending  N/A 
47 EON v. Spain ICSID ARB/15/35 ECT Pending  N/A 
48 OperaFund v. Spain ICSID ARB/15/36 ECT Pending  N/A 
49 Silver Ridge v. Italy ICSID ARB/15/37 ECT Pending  N/A 
50 SolEs v. Spain ICSID ARB/15/38 ECT Pending  N/A 
51 STEAG v. Spain ICSID ARB/15/4 ECT Pending  N/A 
52 Belenergia v. Italy ICSID ARB/15/40 ECT Pending  N/A 
53 Hydro Energy v. Spain ICSID ARB/15/42 ECT Pending  N/A 
54 Watkins v. Spain ICSID ARB/15/44 ECT Pending  N/A 
55 Landesbank v. Spain ICSID ARB/15/45 ECT Pending  N/A 
56 Adamakopoulos v. Cyprus ICSID ARB/15/49 CY-GR BIT;  Pending  N/A 
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BLEU-GR BIT 
57 Eskosol v. Italy ICSID ARB/15/50 ECT Pending  N/A 
58 Sun-Flower v. Spain ICSID ARB/16/17 ECT Pending  N/A 
59 Infracapital v. Spain ICSID ARB/16/18 ECT Pending  N/A 
60 Nova Group v. Romania ICSID ARB/16/19 NL-RO BIT Pending  N/A 
61 Sevilla v. Spain ICSID ARB/16/27 ECT Pending  N/A 
62 Amlyn Holding v. Croatia ICSID ARB/16/28 ECT Pending  N/A 
63 Veolia v. Lithuania ICSID ARB/16/3 FR-LV BIT Pending  N/A 
64 UniCredit Bank v. Croatia ICSID ARB/16/31 AT-CR BIT Pending  N/A 
65 VC Holding v. Italy ICSID ARB/16/39 ECT Pending  N/A 
66 Eurus v. Spain ICSID ARB/16/4 ECT Pending  N/A 
67 ESPF v. Italy ICSID ARB/16/5 ECT Pending  N/A 
68 Rockhopper v. Italy ICSID ARB/17/14 ECT Pending  N/A 
69 Portigon v. Spain ICSID ARB/17/15 ECT Pending  N/A 
70 Magyar Farming v. Hungary ICSID ARB/17/27 UK-HU BIT Pending  N/A 
71 Elitech v. Croatia ICSID ARB/17/32 CR-NL BIT Pending  N/A 
72 Raiffeisen Bank v. Croatia ICSID ARB/17/34 AT-CR BIT Pending  N/A 
73 Addiko Bank v. Croatia ICSID ARB/17/37 AT-CR BIT Pending  N/A 
74 Bank of Cyprus v. Greece ICSID ARB/17/4 CY-GR BIT Pending  N/A 
75 Bank of Cyprus Public Company Limited 
v. Greece 
ICSID ARB/17/4 CY-GR BIT Pending  N/A 
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76 DCM Energy v. Spain ICSID ARB/17/41 ECT Pending  N/A 
77 Norvik Banka v. Latvia ICSID ARB/17/47  LT-UK BIT Pending  N/A 
78 Erste Group v. Croatia ICSID ARB/17/49 AT-CR BIT Pending  N/A 
79 LSG Building Solutions v. Romania ICSID ARB/18/19 ECT Pending  N/A 
80 Veolia v. Italy ICSID ARB/18/20 ECT Pending  N/A 
81 Bladon v. Romania ICSID ARB/18/30 CY-RO BIT Pending  N/A 
82 Alverley Investments v. Romania ICSID ARB/18/30 CY-RO BIT Pending  N/A 
83 EBL v. Spain ICSID ARB/18/42 ECT Pending  N/A 
84 European Solar v. Spain ICSID ARB/18/45 ECT Pending  N/A 
85 Canepa v. Spain ICSID ARB/19/4 ECT Pending  N/A 
86 WCV v. Czech Republic PCA CY-CZ BIT Pending  N/A 
87 CSP Equity v. Spain PCA ECT Pending  N/A 
88 PV Investors v Spain PCA No. 2012-14 ECT Pending 
 
N/A 
89 Natland v Czech Republic PCA No. 2013-35 CZ-NL BIT; CY-CZ BIT; BLEU – CZ BIT; ECT 
Pending  N/A 
90 Slot v Poland PCA No. 2017-10 CZ-PO BIT Pending  N/A 
91 Fynerdale Holdings v. Czech Republic PCA No. 2018-18 CZ-NL BIT Pending  N/A 
92 Alten v. Spain SCC ECT Pending  N/A 
93 CEF v. Italy SCC ECT Pending  N/A 
94 Green Power v. Spain  SCC ECT Pending  N/A 
95 Sun Reserve v. Italy  SCC ECT Pending  N/A 
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96 FREIF Eurowind v. Spain SCC ECT Pending  N/A 
97 Triodos v. Spain SCC ECT Pending  N/A 
98 Griffin v. Poland SCC No. 2014/168 BLEU-PO BIT Pending  N/A 
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Annex 2. Pre-Achmea, Concluded intra-EU Investment Arbitrations 
 
N Short Name Legal Ref. IIA Status Year of Decision 
1 Eastern Sugar v Czech SCC 088/2004 CZ-NL BIT Concluded 2004 
2 AES v Hungary II ICSID ARB/07/22 ECT Concluded 2010 
3 Vöcklinghaus v. Czech Republic Ad hoc CZ-GE BIT Concluded 2011 
4 Achmea v. Slovakia PCA 2008-13 NL-SK BIT Concluded 2012 
5 Electrabel v Hungary ICSID ARB 07/19 ECT Concluded 2012 
6 Euram v Slovakia PCA 2010-17 AT-SK BIT Concluded 2012 
7 Servier v Poland PCA FR-PO BIT Concluded 2012 
8 ECE v Czech Republic PCA Case No. 2010-5 CZ-GE BIT Concluded 2013 
9 Micula v Romania (I)  ICSID ARB/05/20 SE-RO BIT Concluded 2013 
10 Anglia and Busta v Czech Republic SCC CZ-UK BIT Concluded 2014 
11 Enkev Beheer v Poland PCA Case No. 2013-01 NL-PO BIT Concluded 2014 
12 Forminster v Czech Republic Ad hoc CY-CZ BIT Concluded 2014 
13 Charanne v Spain SCC 062/2012 ECT Concluded 2016 
14 Isolux v Spain SCC V2013/153 ECT Concluded 2016 
15 Seventhsun v Poland SCC CY-PO BIT Concluded 2016 
16 Busta v Czech Republic SCC Case No. 2015/014 CZ-UK BIT Concluded 2017 
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17 Eiser v Spain ICSID ARB/13/36 ECT Concluded 2017 
18 Energija v Latvia ICSID ARB/12/33 LV-LT BIT  Concluded 2017 
19 Horthel v Poland PCA Case No. 2014-31 NL-PO BIT Concluded 2017 
20 JSW v Czech Republic  PCA Case No. 2014-03 CZ-GE BIT Concluded 2017 
21 WNC v Czech Republic PCA Case No. 2014-34 CZ-UK BIT Concluded 2017 
22 Novenergia v Spain SCC Arbitration 2015/063 ECT Concluded 2018 
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